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# DRIVERS FOR CHANGE

- Recent Catastrophes
- Regulatory Landscape
- Rate Inadequacy The Math does not work
- Investment Returns
- Prior Year Development
- The Challenges Ahead

■ AHL: NYSE




## RECENT CATASTROPHES

"In a risk-taking business, it is easy to generate increasingly better results in the short run by taking on excessive risk or by building lower-quality business - but you will pay for that in the long run,"

Jamie Dimon, CEO – JPMorgan Chase, 2011 Note to Shareholders

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Historical Annual Cat totals - Top 10 1970-2011E					
Rank	Year	Weather-related Nat Cats	Earthquake/ tsunami	Man-made disasters	Total (USD 000s)
1	2005	110,882	<b>2</b> 57	6,039	117,178
2	2011E	51,000	57,000	-	108,000
3	2004	47,829	3,020	3,937	54,786
4	2008	43,365	420	7,897	51,682
5	2010E	26,400	15,000	6,000	47,400
0	1999	34,007	2,790	7,720	44,577
7	2001	12,675	782	30,742	44,200
8	1992	36,699	134	7,185	44,018
9	1994	8,436	20,311	6,881	35,628
10	2007	23,687	504	5,889	30,081

Aftershocks can produce insured losses larger than the initial event – activity can persist for many years

Known Peril - Unknown Concentration

Japan experienced as many Mw 5.0 aftershocks in 10 weeks after Tohoku as in the 10 years before

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Source: Swise Re Sigma
Annual totals for years prior to 2010 are indexed to 2018 USD.
2010-2011 figures are based on loss estimates from AIR, ECECAT, IBMR Weekly and this broker community

M RECENT CATASTROPHES - MODELLING CHANGES - CAPITAL STRAIN V11: Completely revised model Same Underlying Event Set, Hazard Model 2011: V6-7: Post Katrina -Near term rates introduced, along with vulnerability Increases Industry exposure Increase n e50 term rates softened slightly 200 v7 / 2007 v11 / 2011 v4.4 2004 v6 / 2006 v8 / 2008 v9 / 2009 v10 / 2010 v10 / 2011 exposures RMS Version /Exposure Year V11 primary motivation was to fully revise hazard model with new observations → hurricane model development. Source: FMS, Aspen Analysis

AHL: NYSE Note: Progression in loss includes the Impact of Indexetton and exposure growth by RMS as well as the pure model change



#### REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

- Increased regulatory burden globally, particularly in Europe, in part due to:
  - onset of the credit crisis in Q32008 and resulting banking sector turmoil
  - slow or no economic growth
  - Solvency II
- Varying approaches to Solvency II being adopted across Europe
  - UK and Swiss regulators arguably taking a more painstaking and rapid interpretation of the Directive than other countries
  - Over-arching objective of Solvency II is improving policy holder protection; share holder protection is not within its remit – key is finding right balance
  - Where is the industry going to find the returns to pay for the ultimate costs in capital, implementation and maintenance of Solvency II?

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



## RATE INADEQUACY


"Not knowing your costs will cause problems in any business. In long-tail reinsurance, where years of unawareness will promote and prolong severe underpricing, ignorance of true costs is dynamite."


Warren Buffet, 2001 Letter to Shareholders


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



"You never know who's swimming naked until the tide goes out"


-Warren Buffet

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# THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

- · Recession/Interest Rates
- · Aggregation in all its forms
- LJ Civil Litigation Review
- PPOs
- Eurozone Demise or partial break-up of the Eurozone raises considerable challenges for insurers and reinsurers
- Are our existing models "fit for purpose"?

"Golf is a game whose aim is to hit a very small ball into an even smaller hole, with weapons singularly ill – designed for the purpose."

Winston Churchill

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